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Abstract
This article aims at an exposition o f  the coherence among the concepts o f  reason, survival and  
progress in eighteenth century thought (assuming that present-day, critical analyses o f  rationality, 
unlimited economic growth and the competition-generated pressures o f  life refer to concepts rooted 
in the eighteenth century). Eighteent century thought is exemplarized in the economic thought o f  
A dam  Smith and the social/political thought o f  Kant (with a few  references to H um e’s ideas on 
art) in an attempt to show that the coherence among those concepts ought to be understood from  
the angle o f  the (then) important motive o f  conflict/competition. Conflict and competition were 
seen as mechanisms o f  progress and survival in competitive circumstances as a standard or sign o f  
progress; rationality was directly connected with survival
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Reason /  survival /  progress /  eighteenth century
This article is not primarily aimed at producing an argued ‘proof of some proposition, 
but is rather intended as a documented exposition of the coherence among (the cluster 
of) the concepts of reason, survival and progress in the eighteenth century. Such an 
exposition finds its motivation in present-day critical analyses of rationality, unlimited 
economic growth and technological expansion, and the competition-generated pres­
sures of contemporary life. For the purposes of this article, it is assumed that
* contemporary Western culture has important roots in the eighteenth century, and that 
these concepts are part of those roots. (It does not fall within the scope of this article 
to analyse the historical links that connect today’s pressure for success (pragmatism, 
profiteering and winning as life styles) to Darwinism and nineteenth century capitalism, 
and the latter again to those eighteenth century concepts; a few pointers at the end will 
have to do.)
1 The financial assistance o f the Institute for Research Development of the HSRC is hereby 
gratefully acknowledged. Opinions expressed and conclusions drawn are those of the author 
and do not necessarily reflect the views of the 1RD or HSRC.
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The eighteenth century is the century of the Enlightenment as well as the beginnings of 
Idealism in the transcendental thought of Kant. All eighteenth century thinkers can of 
course not be discussed here; we shall rather exemplarize that century in analysing the 
thought of Adam Smith and Kant (with a few references to ideas of Hume - discussed 
in Venter, 1992? - and others). Adam Smith, one would expect, would - in a philoso­
phical context tempt approach from the angle of ‘moral sentiments’; I intend to disrupt 
such expectations and zoom in on Smith, the economist. And, for once, K ant’s three 
Critiques may take backstage in favour of some shorter - and less known - treatises.
In the coherence among the m entioned concepts, the motive of conflict/ competition 
played a very important role at the time - it functioned as mechanism  of progress, and 
survival against the odds of conflict/com petition, as a sign or a standard of progress. 
Rationality can directly be related to survival (Hume; cf. Venter, 19927:126), or trans­
cend competition as an ideal (Adam Smith), or even be the factor causing the conflict 
(Kant).
The exposition is built upon different kinds of evidencing:
* To understand the conceptual coherence in historical context, a limited character­
isation of the Enlightenm ent, as the dominating view of man and world in the 
eighteenth century, and the populariser of the belief in progress, is given in 
advance. This characterisation is used as an explanatory device in the discussion of 
the two authors, who, on their part, may serve as concrete illustrations of the 
characterisation. This procedure may appear as a herm eneutical circle, but the 
characterisation is not in itself solely dependent upon the present illustrative 
figures, but ra ther on a wide reading of the primary sources, which cannot be 
documented here.
* It is attempted to show that the motive of conflict/competition is not considered a 
good in itself, or the morally best way there is, but rather a necessary evil or the 
unavoidable use of a good of lower ranking order, which has to be eliminated by 
some mechanistic, Newtonian state of equilibrium (once the necessary advance­
ment has been attained).
* The focal point of the exposition is the motive of con flic t/ com petition as a 
Western, cultural motive. The functioning of this cultural motive, however, can 
only be explained within the larger thought context of thinkers working in different 
intellectual spheres. In this case one has to take account of Adam Smith’s views on 
ethics and (especially) the foundations of economics and K ant’s ideas on history
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and politics. (Hume’s method of judging the quality of a literary work on the basis 
of its survival against competition, as discussed in Venter (1992?), can of course 
also be noted in this context.) Only by tracing the motive in these different areas 
(thus giving the article a somewhat interdisciplinary flavour), can conflict/com­
petition be presented with some ground as a cultural motive. The relevance of the 
latter is, of course, that it may (partially) explain twentieth century views on 
cultural motor forces (cf. Mussolini, 1935; Foucault,1986).
What could the sense of an exposition like this one be? It may serve as a disclosure of 
some of the invisible roots of our culture, specifically present-day obsessions with 
‘competition’, and ‘victory’, and also help to explain some of the resistance against 
‘success’, ‘bigger and better’, and ‘self-interest’ (cf. Heidegger, 1938; Horkheimer, 
1978; Capra, 1984). From a critical point of view, it thus makes sense to close the 
article with a few remarks on rationality as self-interest, ‘progress’ with or without 
competition, and conflict/competition as the true (?) basis of society.
1.2 The eighteenth century
The link between the French Enlightenment and the French Revolution indicates that 
the Enlightenment must have been more than just another philosophical movement. 
For those who adhered to it, it was a life-view (i. e. it had become a directive vision for 
practical life). In fact, it might be maintained that the Enlightenment provided the first 
fundamentally new life-view after the decline of medieval Christianity had set in. 
Neither the classicism of the Renaissance, nor the scientism of Descartes c.s. exceeded 
the synthetic life-view of the Middle Ages, which allowed for a synthesis of Christian 
and Classical ideas. They were, rather, new accents within the old framework. The 
Enlightenment, however, constitutes a clear break with the synthetic life-view (by 
eliminating the last remnants of Christian doctrine from it).
Enlightenment, as Kant (1783:53) said, represented rational man’s coming of age. It 
was, in fact, a form of rationalism which took as its focal point the spontaneous 
rationality (logicality) expressed in cultural practice (rather than limiting or reducing 
rationality to mathematically intuited truths based on innate or experiential primitive 
ideas).
The synthetic life-view was rejected in favour of the ‘Classical’: we see the very basic 
Christian idea of God’s guidance (implying the dependence of man) replaced with the 
belief in the (inevitable) progress of mankind, combined with a new kind of classicism.
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Those who did find a place for God in the belief in progress, seem to have hidden him 
behind a pantheistically conceived ‘na tu re ’, and conceived of man as continuously 
unfettering himself from the bonds with which he had been bound by nature. En­
lightenment man is comforted by the firm belief that his children will have it better, 
and that this process will not be reversed (those with a more scientistic leaning, like the 
Marquis of Condorcet, would say: cannot be reversed). Representations of the En­
lightenment recognise that their contemporary situation was far from ideal, but believe 
that, almost inevitably, progress would continue - such is the ‘guidance’ of nature. 
Prerequisite to such a view was a conception of ‘nature as teleological, man-centred, 
yet transcending man. This implied a (not always explicitly recognised) dialectical view 
on the relationship  betw een nature and culture: both rom anticising natu re  and 
accepting the inevitability of progress.
The Enlightenment accommodates a variety of views on ‘nature’. The most common 
characteristic of these views on nature is their teleological man-centredness: it refers 
to what man, seen from the perspective of his origin, essentially is, or should be, or is 
intended to become (or all of these together). Within this anthropocentricism there is 
a wide variety of views: the original, pre-social man (Rousseau); the free. Ideologic­
ally guided development of the original, rural, farming hawker (Adam Smith); the 
intellectually refined courtier (Hume). (To these may be added K ant’s animalistic, 
instinctual, pre-rational man.)
These thinkers were struggling with ‘evil’ as a counter-exam ple for progress. The 
anthropocentric conception of nature implied that man was uplifting himself, yet it was 
factually true that man was suffering at the hands of man (the Jacobins!). As is often 
the case in providential theologies, so also in this ‘na tu ra list’ teleology: ‘evil’ is 
incorporated into the intentions of the dominant ‘good’. Competition, inequality, lack 
of freedom, conflict, are recognised as ‘evils’, but are also conceived of as essential 
components in the progress to a social order in which these evils will be absen t/neu­
tralised. In the interim  period absolute state power has to guarantee my freedom 
(Rousseau); or: I expect my bread and beef from the selfishness of the baker and the 
butcher (Adam Smith); or: cultural progress is guaranteed by the continuous prepa­
ration for war (Kant).
No view which bases human progress on conflict, competition, selfinterest, striving for 
honour, power, etc., can provide much doctrinal space for the opposite ideas, like 
‘loving your neighbour’ and ‘loving your enem y’. Thus C hristianity - if seriously 
practised - would be an obstacle to progress, and Rousseau would not allow Christian­
ity to be the civil religion.
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The Enlightenment turned away from Christianity to Classical culture for its inspirat­
ion. Classicism is already present in the Renaissance, and we could of course ask what 
the relationship between these two classicisms might be. As in the Renaissance, so in 
the Enlightenment we find the somewhat Stoic gushing about nature, the republicanist 
ideal, the romanistic warrior mentality, and the appreciation of especially the literary 
arts. Enlightenment neo-classicism, however, differs from Renaissance classicism: 
given as its predecessor (Cartesian/Lockean) scientism, with its stress on finding own 
information, it will not, like the Renaissance scholars, accept Classical works as sources 
of information; instead, the Enlightenment idealises the Classical ‘humanist’ way of 
doing things, and will take famous Classical works as normative models (in combi­
nation with the sources of information of its own day). Hume’s competition-survival 
standard of quality in the arts practically implies precisely this kind of (Neo-) 
Classicism; and Adam Smith’s moral standards - the aims of nature - are derived from 
Classical sources. This is not a strong feature in Kant, but (strictly speaking) he does 
not belong to the Enlightenment as a movement.
2. ADAM SMITH AND CAPITALIST ECONOMICS
2.1 Smith and the Enlightenment
One of the classics of Capitalist theory is still Adam Smith’s An Enquiry into the Nature 
and Causes o f the Wealth o f the Nations (1776). Although Smith is known to us as the 
founder of theoretical economics, his university chair in Glasgow was that of a philo­
sopher: he taught ethics and logic (and included his early economic thought in his 
ethics course, under the headings, "Natural Jurisprudence'' and "Politics”). Smith thus 
started his academic career as a philosopher in Enlightenment context - as will be 
shown more clearly in our discussion of his economics.
Although the relationship between his early work, Theory o f Moral Sentiments (1759) 
and An Enquiry into the Nature and Causes o f Wealth o f the Nations has been the 
subject of dispute, some of the themes which we find in mature form in An Enquiry into 
the Nature and Causes o f Wealth o f the Nations, are already present in his earlier work, 
and are rooted in the Enlightenment. According to his biographer, he had, by 1755, 
already accepted the idea that nature guided human affairs in a teleological way, using 
economic growth as the base of social progress. Thus governments had better leave it 
to the citizens to care for their own needs under the guidance of nature (Cannan, in
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Smith, 1776:xxxv). By 1759, in the Theory o f  Moral Sentiments, he exhibits a well- 
developed sense of freedom, probably following his teacher, Hutcheson, but rejecting 
the latter’s acceptance of benevolence as a prerequisite for a free society, arguing that 
specific recognised virtues (such as saving, working hard, etc.) have their roots in self- 
interest, whilst their opposites are being frowned upon (M anenschijn, 1979:124-6; 
Cannan, in Smith, 1776:xli-xlii). He also defended freedom in the form of selfinterest 
against Bernard M andeville’s satire, The Grumbling Hive, or, Knaves Turn’d Honest 
(1705/1714/1729), saying that Mandeville too easily represents what does not belong 
to ascetic sobriety or stoic apatheia as selfishness, hypocrisy, and evil, and uses this to 
establish his favourite conclusion th a t private vices are  public benefits (Sm ith, 
1759:485).
Thus Smith shares with the Enlightenment the special interest for the ambivalent role 
of nature, which, in Smith’s usage, can mean anything from "that which is on hand", to 
"the normal", or "that which happens according to norm" (Manenschijn, 1979:218). It is 
also clear from his enthroning of self-interest that we ought to expect from him a social 
theory with competition of interests at its basis, and that he thus shares the Enlighten­
ment dialectics of individual versus society. His theory of progress is that of a gradual 
advance towards the dominance of reason, but, given the level of developm ent of 
mankind (in his day), he stresses the primary role of the passions, which guide us in 
following a justified measure of self-interest. In other words, if every person cares for 
his own survival and tha t of his kin, society will make progress independent of 
individual intentions, and fairness will come about through the equilibrium of contract. 
His moral ideals are those of the peripatetic intellectual, who represents the highest 
level of morality, in which benevolence reigns, thus - though in a subdued way - Smith 
does find his normative ideal for a moral society somewhere in Classical antiquity.
2.2 Smith’s ethics
Although Smith accepts Hutcheson’s leibnizian idea of a cosmic harmony, he maintains 
that we are not able to interpret it in a moral sense. Thus he separates G od’s final 
causality (the teleology of nature) from human efficient causality (taking care of one’s 
affairs and propagating the species; Smith, 1759:292). If we, however, do our very best 
regarding the latter, we unknowingly contribute to the execution of Providence’s plan 
for the human species (1759:166).
This separation allows Smith (about 1750) to develop theories of morality and econo­
mics in a practically  m echanistic way (in spite of a m acrocosm ically organistic
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approach). This tendency to mechanism dates from Smith’s early interest in Newton, 
seen in his essay, The Principles which Lead and Direct Philosophical Enquiries 
Illustrated by the History o f Astronomy (about 1750) in which he uses the concept of 
agreeability (also used in his ethics to indicate the morally positive) as the (gravi­
tational) equilibrium state of the imagination in theory formation (Smith, 1980:45-6). 
The concept of agreeability for the imagination and the feelings, as well as the idea of 
gravitation towards an equilibrium, is given a central role in both Smith’s ethics and his 
economics. Thus these theories acquire a mechanistic appearance akin to those of 
Darwin and Freud, and much more ‘naturalist’ than, for example, Hume’s (competit­
ion-based) views on art (as analysed in Verfter, 1992?).
Smith (1759:31ff) ‘baptises’ self-interest (called "selfish passions") in the face of 
Hutcheson and Mandeville by according it a midrange area between the social and the 
unsocial passions. Self-interest is subjected to the judgement of the impartial spectator
- a proto-freudian internal, imaginary-objective super-ego, who judges, under the 
guidance of agreeability, according to the rules of prudence (longterm self-interest) 
and justice (social interest) - so as to avoid conventionalism (seeing that the individual 
becomes a moral creature only through society), as well as arbitrary, individualistic 
sentimentalism (1759:130-159).
Moral rules are not discovered by reason, which is limited to finding agreeability only 
indirectly through recognition of utility - they are directly ‘intuited’ by the (hedonistic- 
ally conceived) sense of agreeability or disagreeability of immediate feeling:
Though reason is undoubtedly the source o f the general rules o f morality ... it is altogether 
absurd ... to suppose that the first perceptions of right and wrong can be derived from reason ... 
Reason may shew that this object is the means of obtaining some other which is naturally either 
pleasing o r displeasing, and in this manner may render it agreeable or disagreeable, for the sake 
of something else. ... If virtue, therefore, in every particular instance, necessarily pleases for its 
own sake, and if vice as certainly displeases the mind, it cannot be reason, but immediate sense 
and feeling, which in this m anner reconciles us to  the one and alienates us from the other 
'  (Smith, 1759:16).
Smith apparently chooses sensualist hedonism instead of Hume’s utilitarianist 
hedonism. Reason as the detector of utility can only bring about an indirect hêdonê, 
and as the formulator of general rules it can only do so on the basis of repeated direct 
experiences of hêdonê. He seems to approach Mandeville in his denial of a rational 
basis for a progressive society, only substituting the sensual for Mandeville’s ‘evil’. This 
kind of ‘irrationalism’ in an age of reason seems very strange. We, however, must keep 
in mind that Smith was looking for a mechanism of automatic progress, working on the
Koers 57(3) 1992:319-344 325
Reason, survival, progress in eighteenth century thought
basis of gravitational constancy, and that, given the fact that reason is the highest 
faculty of man, progress also encompasses the growth of rationality and freedom (cf. 
also Raphael, 1975:97). Thus Smith latches onto the physicalist constancy and imme­
diacy of the interaction of passions to gain insight in the supposed laws of supposed 
progress. Smith seems, as the Marquis of Condorcet also did, to assume an analogy 
betw een the developm ent of the individual and that of m ankind. A child grows 
through the pleasure/pain phase into the emulation phase (in which his behaviour is 
determ ined by the passion for out-shining others), and ends up as a m ature human 
being in the phase of virtue (in which not the praise of others, but the praiseworthiness, 
determines his behaviour) (1759:41ff., 114-7, 145ff.). From the latter point of view, the 
mature human being rises above group morality. For, in general, society functions at 
the em ulation level, with ambition as its driving force, but m an’s conscience is not 
bound to this.
Of course we can transcend the em ulation level: the individual ‘P eripate tic’ or 
‘A cadem ic’ to superprudence (which consists of prudence, sanctified justice, and 
benevolence); society to ‘Epicurean’ benevolence (composed of justice and embellish­
ment) (1759:216) - this is the Classicist ideal in Smith’s ethics.
The latter two levels of moral progress (namely the virtue and the emulation phases) 
reflect the parallel of reason and passion, and provide for two social orders, being 
roads to the same (natural-teleologically determ ined) end - the one via wisdom and 
virtue; the other via the accum ulation of wealth and greatness (1759:170). Smith 
clearly anticipated Marx’s base - superstructure model in accepting that cultural growth 
is dependent upon the accumulation of material goods.
For the time being man is at the second level - that of ‘accum ulation’. Although the 
higher (rational) road is ethically preferable, Hutcheson was mistaken in thinking that 
only benevolence could be the basis of a moral society, for a society may subsist on the 
basis of the utility of exchange:
S ocie ty  m ay subsist am o n g  m en , as am o n g  d iffe re n t m erch an ts , from  a sen se  o f  its utility , 
w ithou t any m utual love and affec tion; and  though  no m an  in it be bound  in g ra titu d e  to  any 
o th e r, it m ay still b e  upheld  by a m ercen ary  exchange o f  good offices accord ing  to  an  ag reed  
valuation (Sm ith, 1759:86).
Note the exchange/hawker/barter m etaphor in Sm ith’s explanation of the basis of 
society. This m etaphor binds Smith to the contract-idea of society, as expressed by 
Rousseau and Hobbes. Bartering, according to Smith’s economic theory, is basically 
human and basically contractual. Smith presupposes that just as the astronomical
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system is maintained by the interaction of gravitational forces, so the whole of society 
is ordered by the equilibrating forces of contract in exchange (whether it be emotions, 
good offices, or goods). The latter seemingly forms the basis of social cohesion; the 
society which he has in mind is energized by ambition: anticipating Veblen’s theory of 
the leisure class, Smith states that progress is caused by the poor wanting to live as the 
rich do. The passion of ambition, if tempered by prudence and justice, is always admir­
ed (1759:173). In An Enquiry into the Nature and Wealth o f the Nations (1776) Smith 
gives us this theory of social cohesion and progress. This is the only way to explain the 
existence of society at all, once one has given up on every humanitarian form of social 
cohesion (like love, friendship, family obligations, etc.) as explanatory.
23  The foundations of economics
Having read the Theory o f Moral Sentiments, one knows that the foundational role of 
selfinterest - as maintained in An Enquiry into the Nature and Wealth o f the Nations, 
serves for more than just getting bread on the table. The creation of wealth is one of 
the ways to fulfil the goal of man. Benevolence is in itself not able to sustain the 
cohesion of society and provide for the survival of the individual, for human beings, 
unlike other animals (and in this Smith follows Hutcheson) cannot survive without the 
assistance of other human beings, but can also not depend on their benevolence for 
own survival. Thus Smith falls back on the self-interest principle as a mechanism of 
survival, and ‘to survive’ here practically means ‘to survive together’:
But man [in contrast to the other animals - JJV] has almost constant occasion for the help of his 
brethren, and it is in vain for him to expect it from their benevolence only. H e will be more 
likely to prevail if he can interest their self-love in his favour, and shew them that it is for then- 
own advantage to  do for him what he requires of them. ... It is not from the benevolence of the 
butcher, the brewer, o r the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own 
.  interest. We address ourselves, not to their humanity but to their self-love... (Smith, 1776:16).
In survival terms, man is by nature a hawker. That we have specialisation among men 
is natural, being a gradually realised consequence of bartering. Thus as Rousseau, and 
later also Marx, has it, man is originally unspecialised; from them Smith (1776:15) 
differs, however, by expressly appreciating specialisation as a good consequence of 
human nature: it is the necessary consequence of the uniquely human propensity to 
truck, barter and exchange (Smith, 1776:15).
Smith seems to give some credit to practical reason and the organs of communication 
for enabling mankind to live up to its bartering nature, and it is surely difficult to
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imagine how interests can be weighed and conditions set without logic (i.e. determining 
of utility) and speech (coming to agreem ent on terms). Reason, for Smith, is the 
‘organ’ which provides insight into the means for agreeable ends, and thus has to play 
some guiding role in the bartering process (which has a means-ends structure). In this 
he approaches H obbes’ idea that rationality is self-preservation m anifested in the 
concluding of contracts. But for Smith contracting in the sense of bartering is natural 
to man even in his primitive state (which Hobbes may have denied). Thus the possibi­
lity of specialisation is there very early, to assist man on his way to civilisation. It is this 
which determines the differences amongst human beings: the genius is the product, 
not o f nature, but of culture (hab it, custom , education), through specialisation  
(1776:17-18). (Marx later copied this without acknowledging the source!)
In general, although Smith joins Hutcheson in stressing the essentiality of co-operation 
amongst individuals, he has a different idea concerning the foundations of co-ope­
ration: instead of Hutcheson’s benevolence he proposes self-interest, as expressed in 
exchange. But, importantly (and the principle of specialisation implies this): behind 
the bartering process lies the labour of the seller which determines at what rate he will 
be prepared to part with the product of his labour. The higher his input of troubles or 
expertise into the product, the higher the price will be (Smith, 1776:49).
Smith’s theory of prices has its roots in a view of man’s historical development. Like 
many other Enlightenment thinkers, Smith (1776:49-50) applies reverse extrapolation 
to determine the course of this development:
In th e  advanced s ta te  o f  socie ty , a llow ances o f  th is k ind, for su p erio r h a rd sh ip  and  skill, are 
com m only m ade in  the  w ages o f labour; and  som eth ing  o f  the  sam e kind m ust probably  have 
taken  place in its earliest and  rudest period . In this s ta te  o f things, the  w hole p roduce  o f labour 
belongs to  th e  la b o u re r ; an d  th e  q u an tity  o f  la b o u r  com m on ly  em p lo y ed  in  ac q u ir in g  or 
producing  any com m odity, is the  only circum stance which can  regu la te  the  q u an tity  o f labour 
which it ought com m only to  purchase, com m and, o r exchange for.
Price formation in the advanced state of society is, of course, much more complex, and 
has at least to provide for the rent of land and profits of stock, over and above the 
wages of labour. In this case the labourer does not own the whole produce of his 
labour, but shares it with those who receive the other components of the price, i.e. the 
landlord and the capitalist (Smith, 1776:51). (Again Marx finds a direct handle on 
Adam Smith - by using the same reverse extrapolation, and romanticising the original, 
unspecialised man as labourer, he could expose the injustices of capitalism very sharp­
ly.)
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Smith calls the price thus determined the natural price, to be distinguished from the 
actual or the market price. The latter is determined by supply and demand, where 
‘supply’ and ‘demand’ are actually only names for two kinds of competition (1776:58).
It is important to note that there are two kinds of equilibrium of exchange involved 
here. Firstly, there is the market equilibrium, where supply equals demand, and 
secondly, there is the natural equilibrium (at the level of the natural price), the point 
above which the producer will tend to push, and below which the buyer will tend to 
push the price of the product. The quantky of supply and demand - thus competition - 
will determine the respective effectivity of their pushing and pulling - i.e. contracting. 
The natural price is therefore something like the centre of a planet: the point to which 
smaller bodies tend to ‘fall’. Note Smith’s terminology (1776:60) in this regard:
The natural price, therefore, is, as it were, the central price, to which the prices of commodities 
arc continually gravitating. Different accidents may sometimes keep them suspended a good deal 
above it, and sometimes force them down even somewhat below it. But whatever may be the 
obstacles which hinder them from settling in this centre o f  repose and continuance, they are 
constantly tending towards it (my italics - JJV).
Smith’s theory of the natural price expresses the anthropocentric way in which Enligh­
tenment thinkers used to speak about nature. It concerns human interests in the 
bartering situation, and yet functions as superhuman absolute for price formation. The 
natural price, set in the gravitational metaphoric model, implies a difficulty. Smith 
believes in progress, which for him implies that the poor masses will imitate the rich 
few, and exert themselves to attain the same level of wealth. But as they have only 
limited means to compete, their influence on effective demand is not strong, and 
competition will always neutralise their progress by the tendency towards equilibrium. 
And as Smith accepts the teleological idea of nature, he assumes that intervention by 
society will inhibit rather than promote progress. Thus this model, consequentially, 
seems to point to stagnation rather than upliftment. The only way, seemingly, to make 
a breakthrough here, is for the rich to spend their money on useless and vain things, so 
as to widen the scope of employment: if Smith does not want to buy greed from 
Mandeville, he will have to buy extravagance. (Given the assumed greed for accumula­
tion of capitalists, savings will theoretically be assumed as immediately re-invested.)
As can be derived from the above, Smith is prepared to accept the striving for luxury as 
something positive in teleological terms. But Smith’s mind is not fully at rest about the 
urban society of his day. Already in Theory o f Moral Sentiments (1759:50-66) he despis­
es the lifestyle of the rich, for they corrupt moral sentiments by despising and 
neglecting the poor (especially in the exchange of passions). He proves to be an
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agrarian capitalist who sees in human nature not only the barterer, but also the farmer. 
In the ‘prim ordial’ life of agrarian simplicity, much of the evil of urban and inter­
national trade is elim inated . A lthough difficult to  believe, the sam e m an who 
propagates progress through ambition, wrote romanticising passages on rural life (cf. 
1776:356-7). With Rousseau, Smith apparently finds th e /a  source of corruption in 
human institutions, and longs for some ‘primitive’ harmonious relationship with non­
human ‘nature’. But even in this longing Smith stays capitalist. The cultivation of land 
does not only provide the most secure investment for capital, but also produces the 
highest profit, and thus the added value of investment in agriculture is, for society at 
large, the most advantageous of all investments (1776:344).
We should, in fact, not be surprised by this (sudden) quasi-rom antic longing for 
paradise. Even in this Smith is part and parcel of the Enlightenm ent. The tension 
between nature and culture, between origin and progress, expresses itself also in his 
thought. And as is the case with Rousseau, so also with Smith: the evils of institu­
tionalised life and glitter fulfil a necessary role in the advance of mankind. The farmer 
cannot cultivate his land without artificers to make and repair his tools for him; the 
artificers themselves need one another, as well as bakers and butchers ... And so towns 
develop as a necessary concom itant to the developm ent of agriculture. From this 
develops commerce, first locally, then internationally. Smith (1776:359) sees this 
development from agriculture to local manufacture, and then to foreign trade, as "the 
very natural order of things", but complains that in ‘m odern’ Europe this order had 
been inverted. In this case foreign commerce had determ ined the products to be 
manufactured, and the latter again had lead to "the principal improvements" in agricul­
ture. By now one can guess what Smith’s explanation for this would be: the state/the 
government created this unnatural and retrograde coercion.
Our analysis of Smith’s doctrines has ended more or less where we started: with the 
opinion that there is a natural order of progress which ought to be left intact by human 
institutions, and that the natural progress will be served much better if everybody were 
left to care for h is /her own interest. This implies that the progress o f society - a 
progress towards rationality and benevolence - is seen to be the product of competition 
of interests, of which the worst effects are neutralised by different kinds of equilibrium 
of exchange, both on the emotional (moral) and on the economic level.
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3. IMMANUEL KANT AND CULTURAL PROGRESS
3.1 Kant and the Enlightenment
Usually Kant is analysed from the point of view of the three critiques, and very often 
only the Critique o f Pure Reason comes under focus. Kant has, however, left behind 
certain small treatises on the philosophy of history and politics, which have only 
recently begun to command the attention of the broader philosophical community. 
These treatises, in which some (othefwise) hidden foundations of his thought are 
exposed, appear almost as confessions of faith on Kant’s side. They quite clearly reveal 
Kant’s roots in the life-view of the Enlightenment. This does not imply that Kant can 
simply be treated as an Enlightenment philosopher, but rather that Enlightenment 
ideas had polluted the intellectual environment, and were picked up by Kant.
The supposition of a pollution of ideas forces us at least to date Kant with reference to 
the Enlightenment. Of the famous Enlightenment authors, Voltaire was a senior: 
born in 1796, he died in 1778; his works appeared between 1734 and 1764. Hume was 
born in 1711 and died in 1776; his chief works being published between 1739 and 1761. 
Rousseau was a year younger and died in 1778; his major publications appeared 
between 1752 and 1762. Adam Smith was born in 1723 and died in 1790; the Theory of 
Moral Sentiments was published in 1759 and the Enquiry into the Nature and Wealth of 
the Nations in 1776. Kant was a contemporary of Smith, but lived somewhat longer: 
born in 1724, he died in 1804; his major works appeared very late, the first critique in 
1781, the second in 1788, and the third in 1790. The four treatises which I intend to 
focus upon appeared between 1783 and 1795 . Thus it is clear that there was ample 
time for the pollution of ideas to have taken place before Kant’s major works or these 
treatises could see the light; his critical idealism in fact cohered with the Enlighten­
ment’s basic tenets (possibly excluding its Neo-Classicism).
The treatises which I have in mind are the following:
* Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Aufklárung? (1783)
* Idee zu einer Allgemeinen Geschichte in Weltburgerliche Absicht (1784); 
Mutmasslicher Anfang der Menschengeshichte (1786);
* Zum Ewigen Frieden (1795).
With the Enlightenment Kant shares the following themes: Firstly, the central role of 
‘nature’, conceived of as teleological and anthropocentric yet transcending man; the 
dialectical tension between nature and culture (sometimes specified as instinct versus
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reason); the belief in progress; and the use of the conflict/com petition motive as 
mechanism of progress. Although reason is the source of autonomous choices (which 
later represents the real Enlightenment emancipation of man), it does so unknowingly 
under the guidance of nature, which uses man’s limited specialisation and the struggle 
for survival, to enforce the progress of the species. K ant believes, however, that 
nature’s evil means will eventually be neutralised by an equilibrium; a balance of pow­
ers which will automatically m aintain itself - eternal peace. It should be clear that 
Kant’s conception of cultural progress is structurally very near to Adam Smith’s views 
on economic progress. The teleology of nature, however, is much more ‘up front’ in 
Kant - a characteristic which intensifies the dialectics between autonomous reason and 
nature, and between individual and species.
3.2 Kant’s life-view
Those who are acquainted with the contents of Kant’s three critiques may have a re­
presentation of Kant’s thought in terms of an ‘ontology’ of ‘consciousness’ or ‘reason’. 
We have a picture of a three-storeyed consciousness, with the imagination as ground s 
floor, the understanding as the first floor, and judgem ent on the top floor. The 
m ateria ls of cognition are progressively synthesised or unified by the faculties 
inhabiting each storey. This structural model is used to explain the limits of scientific 
knowledge, to provide for a critique of metaphysics, and to explain judgem ent and 
praxis. It is, however, all too often not realised that this ontology of consciousness did 
not stand on its own, but was embedded in the framework of the Enlightenment world­
view, specifically its views on history and progress. Consciousness is subject to the 
dominance of either instinct or reason depending on the level of advancement. In other 
words, imagination, understanding and judgem ent either perform their duties under 
the government of instinct or of reason.
The dom ination by instinct is characterised as slavery, that by reason as freedom ; 
instinct is directly connected to nature, reason to culture. Progress moves from the 
instinctual to the rational, provided that we keep in mind that the progress of the 
individual is not exactly analogous to that of the species, and that certain activities (like 
art) are naturally instinctual, whilst others (like science) naturally lend themselves to 
accepting the guidance of reason. And the whole history of mankind is under the 
inescapable government of nature, aimed at this very progress.
Thus we have to look at the history of man’s progress.
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33  The method of a philosophical historiography
When Kant writes about the history of man, he applies specific norms of a rational 
historiography, searching for a system, a kind of regularity in human behaviour. This 
approach is not out of tune with the approaches of his contemporaries or near prede­
cessors (e.g. Hume, Smith, Hobbes, Vico, Condorcet, etc.).
Within Kant’s basic distinction, there is, apparently, room for two opposite kinds of 
system, namely the rational versus the natural. And given that human freedom (al­
though the product of reason) does not seem to follow any rational pattern whatsoever, 
Kant assumes a natural pattern for it, rather than no system at all, which means that 
historical succession is supposed to take place according to a plan of nature. This has 
two implications:
* the course of history is not determined by conscious decisions of man, but rather 
according to natural law;
’ nature is seen in an anthropomorphic or even theomorphic way as guiding the 
world according to intention.
Regarding the first, Kant (1784:33) is very explicit:
It docs not m ailer how we metaphysically conccivc of the freedom of the human will; the 
appearances thereof, namely the actions of man, arc determined under the force of natural law, 
precisely like every o ther natural event. ... [Kant refers to the regular patterns shown by 
population statistics, and continues:] Individual people, and even whole nations, do not often 
think about the fact that they, while striving - every one in his own way and often in conflict with 
one another each for his own goal, unconsciously follow the goal of nature (which is unknown 
to them), as if they arc on leading-strings, and are involved in the promotion of that which, if it 
.  were known to them, would not have much significance for them.
And though - touching the second implication - the people do not know what nature 
intends with or for them, Kant does know, and we could summarise his knowledge in 
one word: progress! Or, as Kant himself expresses it (1784:35,45; cf. also 1786:92):
It has been determ ined that all natural abilities of a creature will one day develop themselves 
fully and effectively. ... In man, as the only rational creature on earth , the special natural 
abilities aim ed at the  use of his reason, need only develop fully in the species, not in the 
individual. ... We can regard the history of the human species in general as the execution of a 
hidden plan of nature, to crcate a perfect legal order, both within and amongst states, as the only 
situation in which it can develop all its abilities in mankind.
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The belief in progress, underscored by the reference to statistics and bound up with 
strict natural law, does remind one of the work of the M arquis of Condorcet. The 
works of a man of wide reading, like Kant, become a microcosm of the literature of his 
time - unfortunately Kant neglects specific references to his sources.
Few people know that Kant left us with his own commentary on the history of man 
according to the G enesis account, entitled Mutmasslicher Anfang der Menschenge- 
schichte (Presumed Start o f  Human History)(ll&6), in which he tried to reconstruct 
human progress from its origin. Methodologically he follows the reverse extrapolation 
procedure characteristic of Enlightenment attempts at reconstructing ‘natural man’, on 
the the supposition of the uniformity of anthropocentric nature (as if transferring the 
geological methodology of his contemporary, Jam es H utton (1726-1797) into human 
studies), stating that it is possible to delve into past experience on the presupposition - 
in tune with the analogy of nature! - that experience was neither worse nor better in 
the beginning than ‘now’ (1786:85).
As a disclosing guideline for the early history of man, Kant accepts the ‘holy charter’ 
(the book of Genesis), but allows himself the freedom of "a journey ... undertaken on 
the wings of imagination, although not without a guideline bound by reason to expe­
rience" (1786:85-6). Although quite playful in his approach, and yet quite submissive 
with regard to the authority  o f his ‘holy charte r’, K ant’s presuppositions alm ost 
guarantee that orthodox Jews and Christians will probably not agree with his reading of 
Genesis 2-7. In fact, his flight of presumptive fancy results in reading Enlightenment 
philosophy of progress into Genesis, which makes it almost unrecognisable from the 
orthodox point of view.
Kant periodises human progress from a peaceful, but instinctual start, to a peaceful, 
but rational end. The interim, however, is characterised by misery and conflict. In 
Mutmasslicher Anfang der Menschengeschichte (Presumed Start o f Human History (1786) 
he distinguishes three periods:
* the dominance of instinct and the awakening of reason;
* the development of labour;
* the development of an urban way of life.
In line with the Idee zu einer Allgemeine G esch ich te(\lM ) and Zum  ewigen Frieden 
(1795) one could distinguish a fourth period in K ant’s historiography, namely the 
development of nations, which ends up in a league of nations under international law. 
Since this development is motorised by the mechanism of conflict, which implies the 
rise and fall of nations and civilisations, Kant has to find a special methodological prin­
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ciple to guard progress through successive collapses of civilisation. For this purpose, 
he (Kant, 1784:48-49) uses an analogue of the catastrophistic method - used by another 
contemporary, the biologist Bonnet (1720-1793), to explain the transformation of 
miniatures (embryos) into higher species - to interpret the progressive succession of 
civilisations:
As long as one only pays attention everywhere to the civil legal order and its laws, - in so far as 
both, by the good which they contained, served for some time to uplift and glorify nations (and 
with them  also the arts and sciences), but álso caused them  to  collapse, because o f the short­
comings inherent in them (but yet in such a way that there always remained a germ o f enlighten­
ment, which, developed further by each revolution, prepared another, even higher phase of the 
development) - then , I think, a guideline will reveal itself, which can serve not only to explain 
such a confused play of human affairs ...
Of course a history which shows the almost cyclical rise and fall of nations and 
civilisations, does not in itself provide hope. But hope is methodologically built into 
the system by using the metaphor of bonnetian catastrophism in terms of the plan of 
nature. Thus one cannot only uniformly extrapolate to the beginning of history, but 
also predict the future chiliastic state in spite of all catastrophies that may befall 
mankind.
3.4 Animal versus rational
We have, next, to ask what Kant’s views on historiography and progress specifically
implied for his treatment of man in history. Three aspects are of significance here.
* Firstly, Kant treats man in a naturalistic way (as an animal), or rather explains his 
historical actions from the perspective of his animality.
* Secondly, man’s progress is a progress towards greater rationality, peace and a 
moral society, i.e. man becomes something more than an animal, but by virtue of 
his animality.
* Thirdly, the mechanism of progress is none other than conflict/competition, event­
ually neutralised by the equilibrium of contract.
As to the animality o f man Kant is very explicit, to such an extent that Darwin could
have learnt something from him. Nature, having placed the full development of his
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natural abilities in the (‘eschatological’) Idea of man, has also equipped him in such a 
way that he is forced to the autonom ous developm ent of his highest faculties. By 
limiting m an’s animal capabilities, it forces him to use reason, and to uplift himself 
above the mechanical order of his animal existence (1784:35-36), in such a way that 
man will only have himself to thank for his progress (1784:36-37).
In this context (and related ones), Kant has no qualms in summarily referring to man 
as ‘animal’ (German: Tier), e.g.: "one kind of animal ought to have reason" ("ein Tier- 
gattung soil Vernunft haben", 1784:37), "man is an an im al... who needs a lord" ("Der 
Mensch is ein Tier ... das einen H errn notig hat", 1784:40).
The contrast between the natural and the cultural, instinct and reason, is in itself an 
indication of Kant’s naturalist approach to man. This is clear from the way in which 
Kant treats man’s progress from animality to rationality, which is the second aspect we 
have to focus on. We find this explicitly in the Mutmasslicher Anfang der Menschenge- 
schiclite (Presumed Start o f  the History o f  Man). In this booklet Kant, as has been 
mentioned above, divides the history of man into periods, of which the first, up to the 
fall of Adam and Eve, is interpreted as the initial progress from animal instinctuality to 
human rationality. Man is initially guided by that voice of God which all animals obey: 
instinct (1786:87). No ‘metaphysical’ instinct is intended: Kant thinks in terms of pure 
sensuality under the guidance of nature. O ne is alm ost surprised that he found it 
possible to start with a thinking, talking, human being, for Kant’s Adam is barely on the 
level of a pet dog.
But happily, this first phase is also the phase of the step-by-step awakening of reason, 
which will show itself as the ‘faculty’ of freedom. Reason quickens in four steps:
* Reason lifts its head and with proto-existentialist anxiety attempts alternatives to 
the food prescribed by instinct:
But: it is a characte ristic  o f reason  tha t it can conjure up desires w ith th e  help o f im agination, 
not only w ithou t a re la ted  n a tu ra l drive, b u t even against it. ... T h a t w hich gave occasion  to  
infidelity tow ards the drives o f nature, m ay have been  som ething  sm all, b u t th e  effect o f the  first 
a ttem p t, nam ely  becom ing conscious o f  your reason  as an ability  tha t can transcend  the  bo u n ­
daries w ithin which all anim als are  kept, was very im portan t and  decisive fo r the  way o f life. ... 
m an’s eyes w ere opened because o f it (G en . 3:7). H e  discovered in him self the ability to  choose 
a  way o f  life for him self, and  not to be  bound to  one only, like o th e r anim als (1786:87-88).
* Reason learns that it can dom inate and strengthen the instincts and set ideals for 
them, thus moving in the direction of moral decency, by, for example, postponing 
sexual satisfaction or removing its object from the senses:
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The fig leaf (Gen. 3:7) was (he product of a much bigger expression of reason ... For to intensify 
and expand the duration of an inclination by withdrawing its object from the senses, already 
shows the consciousness of a certain dominion of reason over the drives.... (1786: 89-90).
* Man having realised his ability to transcend the purely sensual and live a (possibly 
moral) life guided by the Idea (1786:89-90), reason now begins to represent the future, 
thus enabling man to set goals for himself, but at the same time creating typically 
human fears for the future (and death), neutralised only by family comforts and an 
expected better life for one’s offspring (17&6:90).
* Reason is fully awakened in man in understanding that - in contrast to all other 
animals, all of them instrumentalised by man - he himself is no means but an end in 
himself, not to be instrumentalised by anybody. Thus man is elevated to "a certain 
equality with all rational beings, to whatever rank they may belong (Gen. 3:22)" 
(1786:91). This step implied the release of man from the womb of nature, a banish 
ment' into a dangerous world, where he, in the face of obstacles and crises, will often 
long to return to an imagined paradise. But no chance: the restless reason prevents 
such a return and drives man towards the development of his inherent abilities, 
through hateful labour, ignoring approaching death (1786:92).
Thus the first period of human history comprises the awakening of reason, firstly as 
additional option, secondly as governor of the sensual, thirdly as setting goals for future 
realisation, and fourthly as recognising himself as goal, the latter of which signifies 
rational man’s attainment of independence. In this way the ‘primate’, Adam, progres­
sed to the state of homo sapiens.
The characteristics of the Enlightenment analysed above are clearly visible in Kant’s 
summary (1786:92-92) of this progress:
This exposition of the history of the first human beings results in this: that the exit of man from 
paradise, which was proposed to him by reason, as the first sojourn of his species, is nothing but 
the transcendence from the rawness of a simple animal creature to mankind, from the crush-pen 
of instinct to the guidance of reason, in short: from the guardianship of nature to the status of 
freedom. If we look at the destination of the natural species - which consists in nothing else 
than the progress to perfection ... then it cannot be asked anymore w hether man has lost or 
gained by this change. In the meantime this process, which for the species means progress from 
the worse to the better, is not precisely the same for the individual. Before the awakening of 
reason, there  was neither commandment nor prohibition, and thus no transgression. Once it 
started with its task, and weak as it was, had to contend with animality in its full power, disasters, 
and what is worse, as reason became more cultivated, licentiousness had to follow, which was
Koers 57(3) 1992:319-344 337
Reason, survival, progress in eighteenth century thought
totally foreign to  the  sta te  ignorance (and  thus innocence). ... T h e  history  o f na tu re  the refo re  
started  out with the  good, for tha t is the w ork o f G od; the  history o f  freedom  with evil, for tha t 
is the  w ork o f m an. ... th e  inevitable conflict o f cu ltu re with the  na tu re  o f  the  hum an race  ...
The point which Kant makes about the progress of mankind is that it does not end with 
the awakening of reason. The domination of man by reason is itself under the gui­
dance of nature towards the goal of a moral society, for only in that situation can 
nature attain the full development of man’s potential. (Vaguely Kant does have some 
‘new Jerusalem’ notion for man in mind.) The quote exhibits the typical Enlightenment 
ideas of an anthropocentric and teleological nature, the not-so good as an instrument 
or mechanism of progress, and the tensions of nature versus culture, and individual 
versus society/species. As these will sporadically show up in the discussion of the 
mechanism of progress, the conflict/com petition motive, we shall not accord them a 
separate discussion.
3.5 Conflict/competition and the civil order
Kant shares conflict/com petition with the Enlightenm ent as the mechanism of pro­
gress. As mentioned above, Kant (like Adam Smith) believes that man can only be­
come a moral being via society. Thus he needs some firm foundation for the establish­
ment of society, which can also serve as the driving force or instrument of pressure, to 
keep mankind on the road to self-development.
T he m eans which natu re  uses to  establish the  developm ent o f all his ta len ts, is the ir antagonism s 
in society, in so far as these in the end nevertheless becom e th e  cause o f the  legal s truc tu ring  of 
socie ty . By "antagonism " I m e an  th e  unsocia l soc iab ility  o f  m an, th a t is, h is  in c lina tion  to 
socia lise, w hich is n ev e rth e le ss  bound  up w ith co n tin u o u s  res is tan ce  aga in st it, o f which the  
la tte r constantly  th rea tens  to  b reak  up society. T h e  ap titude  for this is visibly p resen t in hum an 
natu re . ... It is precisely this resistance which aw akens all hum an pow er and brings him  to  the 
point o f overcom ing his inclination to  laziness, and  driven by am bition, im periousness and  g reed , 
to  acquire a status for him self am ongst his fellows, which he does not like, b u t cannot set aside. 
F rom  th is  the  first tru e  step  o u t o f raw ness o f  n a tu re  to  cu ltu re  (w hich actually consists in the 
social value o f m an) happens; ... ta len ts  ... develop; ... th e  beginning o f  a way o f  thought which 
can transfer the crude natu ra l ability to  m ora l distinction ... in to  a m oral w hole (1784:36-7).
These words could also have been written by Adam Smith, or rather, Smith may have 
found them too naturalistic to describe his farming hawkers, for they lack the nuance of 
Smith’s midrange between social and unsocial. Even their author felt somewhat un­
comfortable about the harsh mechanism of progress which he had chosen. One should 
imagine that Kant wrote for a public which had been exposed to Christianity, and that
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the mechanism of progress which he proposed, represented the very opposite of what 
Christianity had taught them as the basis of human relationships (namely: love, even 
for the enemy, self-sacrifice, solidarity with the poor, modesty, defencelessness). Thus 
Kant tries to justify the means by the ends - in the name of God: nature, using the 
unsociability of man, forces the human species to uplift itself (although this produces 
catastrophies for the individual), and betrays the ordination of a wise Creator, wishing 
the full development of the natural talents of man as species! (1784:39).
It is the danger which this unsociability represents that forces people to enter into a 
legally ordered society. For the moral development of man, a society is prerequisite in 
which the maximum amount of freedom is balanced with such limitations of freedom 
as is needed for the different individual freedoms to co-exist (1784:39-40). In other 
words: outright conflict must be brought under control, that is, transformed into regulated 
competition. In Mutmasslicher Anfang der Menschengescliichte Kant represents this 
socialisation of man as one which started out with the conflict between agriculturalists 
and herdsmen, and later between townsmen and nomads.
This second period of human history sets in with the change from leisure and peace to 
labour and discord. Some people preferred the easy life of the herdsman, respecting 
no boundaries or property. Others involved themselves in the laborious lifestyle of 
agriculture, for which property and boundaries were prerequisite. This conflict of 
interest leads to the separation of the nomadic herdsmen from the established farmers, 
the latter founding townships for the sake of the defence of their property and persons. 
This of course leads to exchange, culture, (uncontrolled) government, even an elemen­
tary civil legal order, the arts of sociability and civil security, and notably of inequality - 
the source of so much evil, but also of all good - which can lead to despotism. Despo­
tism is only limited by war (!), for war requires wealth which is only created under 
some measure of freedom (1786:97). This freedom is immediately lost, however, when 
the nomads are integrated into urban life and the threat of war disappears. Freedom is 
replaced by licentiousness and slavery - a situation analogous to pre-Enlightenment 
man’s immaturity, due to laziness and cowardice in using his own understanding inde­
pendently (Kant, 1783:53).
One seems to have here some combination of the ideas of capitalism and of Machia- 
velli. The latter propagated the idea that the challenge of war leads to the expansion 
of privileges for the common people, and that inequality and conflict of interest within 
the boundaries of a republic, were necessary for the preservation of freedom (The 
Discourses, 1979, 1:4-6), whilst the former, at least as Adam Smith will have it, argues 
that wealth is only created where we have the least possible government intervention in 
the lives of private individuals.
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The principle of conflict/competition also takes care of international relations. In fact 
it is important that some kind of control of international conflict be found, because the 
moral progress of man and the full development of his abilities depend on his not 
being involved in conflict so deeply that it will obstruct his cultural development, whilst 
also not having so much security that he will not exert himself at all, and simply accept 
immaturity and tyranny (Kant, 1784:45-6). What is, however, really needed is a 
situation of contractual equilibrium, analogous to the legal order within a state. This 
will in a way come into being all by itself, for a time will arrive when the advantages of 
war will be overshadowed by its disadvantages, and mankind will be forced to accept 
an international legal order in the form of a league of nations:
All wars arc, therefore, so many attempts (truly not in the intentions of the people but in those 
of nature), to establish new relationships amongst states, ... until in the end, in part by the 
structuring o f the best possible legal order, in part by com m unal external agreem ent and 
legislation, a situation is established which maintains itself analogously to civil society, just like 
an automat. ... the barbarous freedom of the already established states ... necessitates that our 
species find, in addition to the in itself salutary resistance of many states, a law of equilibrium 
and a united force to support such law; that is, impose a cosmopolitanistic situation of public 
state security; one that is not totally without danger, so that the powers of man would doze off, 
but also not without a principle of equality for their interaction, so that they will not disturb one 
another (Kant, 1784:44).
The ‘constitution’ for this proposed international legal order is set out by Kant in Zum  
Ewigen Frieden. One might say that this is the fourth period of the history of mankind - 
the ‘new Jerusalem’. Generation after generation are working for this: vaguely, or not 
at all, conscious of it, they are involved in the improvement of the situation of their 
offspring, and very often this is the only comfort they can find (Kant, 1786:90; 
1784:37).
The naturalistic harshness and the regime of conflict in Kant’s view of the history of 
mankind, could, in itself, only provide the causes of psychological depression or 
philosophical pessimism. Amidst a history of revolution, catastrophe, ambition, lust for 
power, greed, vanity, the only ray of hope could be the expectation of a better future 
for their offspring. In a context where rationality itself uses evil (towards some unseen 
good), one has to trust nature to provide that better future, nay, to impose it by the 
force of natural law, and so the mechanistic model of equilibrium is found. But Kant is 
also the Kant of the three Critiques: the Kant who believes in autonomous reason. 
Even for that nature has the solution: the animal equipment of man is so limited that 
he is forced to use reason, and thus he can still pat himself on the shoulder for his 
progress.
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4. CONCLUSION
Collecting the results together in a summary comparison, we may conclude the 
following:
Adam  Smith sees a multi-storeyed relationship between the rational and the lower 
faculties (eg. the passions). Reason, forhim, is slow and indirect, and cannot provide 
us with immediate insight into moral norms. Decisive for Smith is the passion for self- 
interest, and the emulative level on which the majority functions. The main road of 
progress, which will end up with a rational situation, is based on the contractual, 
bartering, self-interested character of man. In fact, even the impartial spectator 
(Smith’s proto-freudian figment) judges (rationally, imaginatively) according to the 
longterm self-interest of the individual, weighed against the social interests. When 
everybody cares for his own interests, nature will care for the advancement of the 
totality: Smith has a teleological view of nature (totality), but prefers to focus on the 
individual’s self-interest. Given the latter. Smith supposes a Newtonian ‘gravitiational’ 
equilibrium point (e.g. the natural price) to which competition (the survival motive of 
the contracting parties) will naturally force these parties. He supposes economic 
progress to be the base for cultural progress. This, of course, might be in jeopardy if 
equilibrium were not constantly forced to disequilibrium by the needs of the rich; 
specialisation and capitalist desire for accumulation prevents the process from 
stagnating.
Kant went much further than Smith. He dialectically embedded autonomous reason 
into the mechanistically explained historical plan of nature. His conception of nature is 
both man-centered and teleological. For him not the moderate realisation of self- 
interest, namely competition, but life-and-death struggle, survival of the fittest, is the 
mechanism of progress. And equilibrium is not a perpetually reappearing (and redis­
turbed) state, but the final phase of history, the ‘new Jerusalem’, where conflict is 
replaced by non-destructive, yet stimulating, competition. This state of eternal peace is 
the final realisation of the progress of the human species towards the full development 
of all its natural talents, of which the summit is an autonomous, rational, moral order.
To focus our comparison on the conceptual coherence studied in this article: Smith’s 
conception of reason has discernment of utility/agreeability at its core; Kant identifies 
the ability to choose and evaluate as its axis. For both of them, rationality is the 
highest form of human action, but they agree that, depending on the level of develop­
ment other modes of action may be dominant. For both Smith and Kant survival (de­
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fending one’s own dearest interests) - and whatever precautions may be taken for its 
sake - is a mechanism of progress. Rationality may be part of it, but decisive is the 
supra-individual teleology of nature. Balance, either as norm or as mechanistic 
equilibrium, is present in both thinkers and is presented as the aim of nature. Progress 
is the overall tendency in both Smith and Kant. (These concepts do appear also in 
Hume, but the way in which they are interrelated is somewhat different, probably 
because the Neo-Classicist aspect of his thought is more strongly developed, and 
because of his adherence to an Aristotelian, structural, view of the mind (Venter, 
1992?)).
It was assumed at the beginning that contemporary culture has some roots in this 
eighteenth century combination of
* a teleological rationality, with
* the motive of conflict/competition (self-preservation) which is supposed to pro­
duce quality, and
* the belief in economic/material progress as a basis for human (‘spiritual’) advance­
ment;
* the striving for growth and expansion (‘bigger’, ‘better’) without limits.
There are easily traceable links from Rousseau and Hume to Kant and Adam Smith, 
and from the latter to Malthus, Ricardo, Marx, Darwin, Spencer and Freud. Social 
Darwinism has had a stronghold in economic practice (and was even combined with 
Protestantism in the thought of W. G. Sumner). The Pragmatists have been ‘teaching’ 
us that ideas that work, i. e. improve the situation or help us survive, have truth-value, 
and Sir Karl Popper’s falsificationism is nothing but a survivalist theory of science. 
Strictly competition-based social theories (for example those of Milton Friedman or F. 
A. von Hayek) are clearly part of this continuous tradition. We know that some of 
these theories have become everyday practice, and parts of some are cultivated into 
lifestyles by the boulevard press. The cult of ‘stars’ (whether football or Hollywood 
‘stars’), the ‘publish or perish’ style which the academic enterprise has assumed, the 
cult of success in schools (and the quiet rejection of ‘mediocrity’ or the ‘drop-out’), the 
ridiculous and/or adsurdly dangerous attempts at making it into the Guinness Book of 
Records - are they not possibly the products of the analysed coherence of concepts in 
the eighteenth century life-view? (And didn’t the counter culture, the student revolt of
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’68, the constant reappearance of fringe groups, indicate that for some the cult of 
competition was becoming unbearable?)
This cluster of established (practised) ideas have not gone unchallenged. Note the 
rejection of the modern world view of quantitative ‘giantification’ by Heidegger (1938; 
1959), the penetrating criticism of rationality as self-preservation by Horkheimer 
(1978, 47-48); the shock waves that, for example, Mussolini’s practical interpretation 
of the ennobling function of conflict sent through the Western world (the continuous 
abhorrence of ‘fascism’), and the resistance of socialists (from Godwin and Owen in 
the nineteenth century, through the New Left right up to present-day social demo­
crats), the ’68 student revolutionaries, and the contemporary New Agers (cf. Capra, 
1984) against an all too competitive and success-oriented society; the criticism of 
unlimited growth from different sources (Goudzwaard, 1978; Capra, 1984: 194 ff); the 
challenges to Marxism’s adoption of the base-superstructure model, which is, for 
example, absent from the Marxist reading of the Bible by Gardavsky (1970).
It was stated, during the analysis of the eighteenth century, that the Enlightenment 
represents a final break with the synthetic life-view which flourished during the Middle 
Ages. It amounted to the rejection of the remnants of Christianity in the synthetic life- 
view, and a replacement of these with especially the cluster of concepts analysed 
above. We can see something of this break in Voltaire’s attacks on the Catholic 
church, Rousseau’s rejection of Christianity as a candidate for his civil religion 
(specifically because Christ teaches love of the enemy), Adam Smith’s attempt to deny 
benevolence any essential role in the establishment of society and his explicit 
predilection for a purely Classical morality. The details of this break could not be 
analysed, but clearly some of the Enlightenment ideas were inconsistent with some 
originally Christian (biblical) basic ideas. Self-preservation and self-interest remains 
inconsistent with the biblical idea of love (cf. for example Matt. 5:38-47; Romans 12:9- 
21); progress brought about by man’s own efforts under the guidance of nature is 
clearly in conflict with the biblical idea of history as the way in which the sovereign 
God guides his faithful (part of a depraved and degenerate mankind), to final salvation 
(Hebrews 12; Revelations 19-22); benevolence, support for the needy, sharing of 
burdens - these are some of the biblical ways in which the meaning of work is disclosed 
(cf. for example 2 Cor. 8:1-15; Galatians 6:1-9; 1 Tim. 6:3-21; James 5:1-6); both 
Smith and Kant believe that the well-being of all mankind depends on exactly the op­
posite: stimulation of ego-centrism and controlled conflict-labour is only made mea­
ningful by gain and victory. If this is true, then the cluster of concepts analysed above 
also spells the maturation of secularism in the West.
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